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A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities under the 
Human Rights Act: Private Contractors, Rights-Stripping 
and ‘Chameleonic’ Horizontal Effect 
 
Alexander Williams
 
 
The question whether hybrid public authorities can rely on their own Convention 
rights during the performance of “functions of a public nature” is a key issue, not just 
in itself but also as an important factor to consider in determining the proper scope of 
that term.
1
 Under s.6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998, a private person “certain of 
whose functions are functions of a public nature” becomes a hybrid public authority 
and is therefore required to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) when it undertakes a public act.
2
 This article advances two main arguments. 
First, during the performance of their public functions, hybrid public authorities 
should be regarded by domestic courts as capable of relying on their own Convention 
rights to the same extent as could ‘ordinary’ private persons who are not regarded as 
hybrid public authorities.
3
 Secondly, the most effective way of ensuring adequate 
protection of hybrid public authorities’ Convention rights is to interpret the hybrid 
public authority concept as generating what this article refers to as ‘chameleonic’ 
horizontal effect. Under the chameleonic model, the hybrid public authority scheme is 
seen as creating neither a purely ‘vertical’ nor ‘horizontal’ framework of rights 
protection against hybrid public authorities. Instead, as the term ‘chameleonic’ 
suggests, the framework switches, from ostensibly vertical to a position roughly 
describable as indirectly horizontal in substance, at the point where the dispute 
between private claimant and hybrid public authority defendant reaches court. The 
purpose of the chameleonic model is to guarantee that hybrid public authorities, when 
in court and faced with an attempt by a private claimant to use the Convention against 
them, are able to deploy their own Convention rights defensively against that claimant 
to the same extent as ordinary private persons could. 
 
The following analysis divides into three parts. In view of the intricacies of the hybrid 
public authority concept and the need to justify adding to the already voluminous 
literature concerning the interpretation of s.6(3)(b), the first part makes the research 
case, explaining how this article’s analysis and conclusions inform the understanding 
of the concept. In particular, it explores the potential impact of this article on the 
ongoing debate as to the proper scope of s.6(3)(b) and, in the process, briefly 
introduces and defends against recent judicial attack the basic doctrinal argument in 
favour of reading s.6(3)(b) to include the provision of contracted out public services 
                                                 

 Lecturer in Law, University of Durham. This article derives from a paper given by the author in the 
Civil Liberties section of the Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference on September 7, 2009 at the 
University of Keele. The author is indebted to Stephen Bailey, Fiona de Londras, Helen Fenwick, 
Gavin Phillipson and Adam Tomkins for comments on the paper, on an earlier draft of this article, or 
both. The author would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 On the link between a public authority’s ability to rely on the Convention and the width of the term 
‘public authority’ under s.6, see D. Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public 
functions under the Human Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476, pp.490-492. 
2
 HRA, ss 6(1), 6(3)(b) and 6(5). 
3
 For brief and tentative support for this idea, see H. Davis, “Public Authorities as ‘Victims’ under the 
Human Rights Act” [2005] C.L.J. 315, p.321. 
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by private contractors operating on behalf of central and local government 
organisations.
4
 The second part begins the core analysis by examining and attempting 
to clarify the growing corpus of Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning the concept of 
the ‘governmental organisation’, arguing, contrary to recent judicial and academic 
assumption,
5
 that the concept does not extend to private persons performing ‘public’ 
or ‘governmental’ functions. The result, as the third part explores, is that the bodies 
designated as hybrid public authorities under s.6(3)(b) remain capable of asserting 
their own Convention rights in Strasbourg and under the HRA, even during the 
performance of their public functions. The third part then assesses the implications of 
this finding for the hybrid public authority concept under the HRA, arguing that the 
most appropriate way of ensuring adequate Convention protection for hybrid public 
authorities is to read the hybrid public authority concept in accordance with the 
chameleonic model. 
 
The ‘rights-stripping’ idea and the research case 
The hybrid public authority concept has spawned a considerable amount of literature 
since the HRA’s entry into force,6 the vast majority of which criticises the courts’ 
apparent refusal to interpret s.6(3)(b) to include the provision of contracted out public 
services by private operators acting on behalf of central and local government 
organisations.
7
 The extent to which hybrid public authorities can rely on their own 
Convention rights, however, has never been comprehensively academically or 
judicially addressed.
8
 Hybrid public authorities, as their name implies, are not ‘purely’ 
                                                 
4
 This article does not address the distinct (and less topical) issue of privatisation, where public 
enterprises are divested to private companies. The courts have previously held that the delivery of 
privatised services does not necessarily entail the performance of public functions under s.6(3)(b): 
Cameron v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2006] EWHC 1133 (Q.B.), [2007] 1 W.L.R. 163; James v 
London Electricity Plc [2004] EWHC 3226 (Q.B.). 
5
 Making this assumption, see H. Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of ‘public 
authority’ under the Human Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106; R. (West) v Lloyd’s of London [2004] EWCA 
Civ 506, [2004] H.R.L.R. 27 at [36]-[39] (Brooke L.J.); YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 
27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [161] (Lord Neuberger); R. (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust 
[2009] EWCA Civ 587, [2009] H.R.L.R. 29 at [35] (Elias L.J.) and [117]-[118] (Rix L.J.) (dissenting). 
6
 For an overview, see D. Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions 
under the Human Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476; P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and 
the scope of judicial review” (2002) 118 L.Q.R. 551; D. Oliver, “Functions of a public nature under the 
Human Rights Act” [2004] P.L. 329; C. Donnelly, “Leonard Cheshire again and beyond: private 
contractors, contract and s.6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act” [2005] P.L. 785. More recently, see J. 
Landau, “Functional public authorities after YL” [2007] P.L. 630; M. Elliott, “‘Public’ and ‘private’: 
defining the scope of the Human Rights Act” [2007] C.L.J. 485; S. Palmer, “Public, private and the 
Human Rights Act 1998: an ideological divide” [2007] C.L.J. 559; A. Williams, “YL v Birmingham 
City Council: Contracting out and ‘functions of a public nature’” [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 524. 
7
 See, in particular, P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review” 
(2002) 118 L.Q.R. 551; C. Donnelly, “Leonard Cheshire again and beyond: private contractors, 
contract and s.6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act” [2005] P.L. 785; A. Williams, “YL v Birmingham City 
Council: Contracting out and ‘functions of a public nature’” [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 524; Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, Seventh Report, The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act 
(2003-04 HL 39), (2003-04 HC 382); Joint Committee on Human Rights, Ninth Report, The Meaning 
of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act (2006-07 HL 77), (2006-07 HC 410); S. Palmer, 
“Public functions and private services: a gap in human rights protection” (2008) 6 I.J.C.L. 585. Cf D. 
Oliver, “Functions of a public nature under the Human Rights Act” [2004] P.L. 329. 
8
 Baroness Hale left the issue “for another day” in her dissent in YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] 
UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [74]. Lord Nicholls stated simply that hybrid public authorities should 
be able to rely on their own Convention rights “when necessary” in Parochial Church Council of the 
Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, 
download.docx 3 
public bodies. They are only regarded as public authorities to the extent that they are 
engaged in public as opposed to private activity.
9
 Whilst it is therefore clear that these 
bodies should be able to rely on the Convention in their private capacities, their 
position during the performance of public functions under s.6(3)(b) is less obvious. 
Howard Davis has tentatively noted the possibility that hybrid public authorities 
might be capable of relying on the Convention in their public capacities,
10
 but his 
remarks appear to have been overshadowed by a common and untested assumption 
amongst other academics and judges that hybrid public authorities, when performing 
public functions, are somehow disabled from relying on the Convention.
11
 In the 
Court of Appeal in YL v Birmingham City Council, for example, Buxton L.J. bluntly 
asserted that “when discharging its public functions… [a hybrid public authority] has 
no such rights.”12 The idea that hybrid public authorities lose Convention protection 
when performing public functions will be referred to as the ‘rights-stripping’ idea. 
 
There is no explicit foundation for the rights-stripping idea in the HRA. Neither, it 
would seem, is there an implicit one. Under art.34 ECHR, the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg can only hear Convention complaints from individuals or 
non-governmental organisations.
13
 Governmental organisations, by contrast, are 
therefore incapable of asserting Convention rights. This position is reproduced 
domestically by s.7 HRA, which provides that individuals can only assert Convention 
rights against public authorities in domestic courts if those individuals would satisfy 
art.34 in respect of the same claim brought against the UK in Strasbourg.
14
 Hence, in 
the absence of a sufficiently clear statement by the HRA to give effect to the rights-
stripping idea, s.7 implies that hybrid public authorities can rely on their own 
Convention rights in domestic law, even during the performance of their public 
functions under s.6(3)(b), unless they would be considered by Strasbourg as 
governmental organisations under art.34 ECHR. 
 
The relevant question to ask for present purposes, therefore, is whether or not 
Strasbourg recognises what will be referred to as a ‘hybridity’ doctrine, i.e. a doctrine 
recognising that a private person is legally treated as a governmental organisation 
when performing certain ‘public’ or ‘governmental’ functions. Although no court or 
academic writer has rigorously analysed the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence with 
this specific question in mind,
15
 it is evident from the emerging judicial and academic 
tendency to view the governmental organisation jurisprudence as potentially 
indicative of the meaning of the term “functions of a public nature” under s.6(3)(b) 
that there exists a widespread assumption, at least, that the jurisprudence does 
                                                                                                                                            
[2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [11]. Cf H. Davis, “Public Authorities as ‘Victims’ under the Human Rights Act” 
[2005] C.L.J. 315, p.321. 
9
 HRA, ss 6(1), 6(3)(b) and 6(5). 
10
 H. Davis, “Public Authorities as ‘Victims’ under the Human Rights Act” [2005] C.L.J. 315, p.321. 
11
 See e.g. D. Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the 
Human Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476, p.492; H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the 
Human Rights Act (OUP, Oxford, 2006), p.122; H. Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
meaning of ‘public authority’ under the Human Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106, p.109. 
12
 [2007] EWCA Civ 26, [2008] Q.B. 1 at [75]. 
13
 Article 34: “The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of 
the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.” 
14
 HRA, ss 7(1) and 7(7). 
15
 See H. Davis, “Public Authorities as ‘Victims’ under the Human Rights Act” [2005] C.L.J. 315, 
p.321 for brief analysis, however. 
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recognise private persons as governmental organisations when performing public 
functions.
16
 The second part of this article questions this assumption. The only 
relevance of the governmental organisation jurisprudence to the meaning of “public 
authority” under the HRA, it would seem, is to the identification of core public 
authorities. Section 6 reads as follows: 
 
“(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right… 
(3) In this section ‘public authority’ includes–  
(a) a court or tribunal, and 
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature…  
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of subsection 
(3)(b) if the nature of the act is private…” 
 
Section 6(3), by stating merely that the term “public authority” includes courts and 
tribunals and hybrid public authorities, is typically thought to envisage a residual 
category of ‘obvious’ or ‘core’ public authorities such as central and local government 
organisations.
17
 Whereas hybrid public authorities as private persons performing 
public functions are relieved by s.6(5) from the obligation to comply with the 
Convention in their private capacities, core public authorities, unmentioned explicitly 
by the HRA and thus by s.6(5), are not. Like governmental organisations in 
Strasbourg, all of their acts, whether public or private, must therefore comply with the 
Convention.
18
 
 
Research case and implications 
With the foregoing in mind, this article’s analysis and conclusions impact upon the 
hybrid public authority concept in three main ways.  
 
First, by clarifying the scope of the governmental organisation jurisprudence, they 
state a clear case against the recent judicial inclination to view that jurisprudence as a 
useful interpretative aid to the meaning of the term “functions of a public nature” 
under s.6(3)(b). This finding may affect the scope of that provision because some 
judges have previously refused to interpret s.6(3)(b) as being any broader than the 
scope of the governmental organisation category in Strasbourg.
19
 This represents an 
unjustified restriction on the scope of s.6(3)(b) if, as this article argues, the 
governmental organisation jurisprudence bears no relation to the meaning of the term 
“functions of a public nature” in the first place. 
                                                 
16
 On this assumption, see H. Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of ‘public 
authority’ under the Human Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106; R. (West) v Lloyd’s of London [2004] EWCA 
Civ 506, [2004] H.R.L.R. 27 at [36]-[39] (Brooke L.J.); YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 
27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [161] (Lord Neuberger); R. (Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust 
[2009] EWCA Civ 587, [2009] H.R.L.R. 29 at [35] (Elias L.J.) and [117]-[118] (Rix L.J.) (dissenting). 
17
 See e.g. D. Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the 
Human Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476, p.478; Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow 
and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [7]-[8] 
(Lord Nicholls). 
18
 See e.g. Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, 
Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [7] (Lord Nicholls). On the position 
of governmental organisations in Strasbourg, see Danderyds Kommun v Sweden (Application No. 
52559/99) (unreported); Ayuntamiento de Mula v Spain (Application No. 55346/00) (unreported). 
19
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [159] and [161] (Lord 
Neuberger); R. (West) v Lloyd’s of London [2004] EWCA Civ 506, [2004] H.R.L.R. 27 at [36]-[38] 
(Brooke L.J.). 
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Secondly, comprehensively assessing the extent to which hybrid public authorities 
can rely on their own Convention rights is a useful exercise in itself because the issue 
is likely to require firm resolution by the courts before too long. Parliament has 
recently overruled the conclusion in YL v Birmingham City Council
20
 and the earlier 
case of R. (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation
21
 by enacting the Health and 
Social Care Act 2008 (HSCA), s.145 of which provides for the application of 
s.6(3)(b) HRA to the provision of residential care services by private providers acting 
on behalf of local authorities required by the National Assistance Act 1948 to arrange 
that care. Since private care home operators providing these services can no longer 
deny their status as hybrid public authorities under s.6(3)(b), they will no doubt 
attempt to respond in other ways to Convention-based claims by care home residents 
in court. Taking the classic Leonard Cheshire and YL example of a contracted-out 
care home operator accused in court of violating the right to respect for home life 
under art.8 ECHR by seeking to evict a resident, one such defence might be for the 
provider, now a hybrid public authority, to advance its own Convention right to 
respect for property under art.1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR in order to justify 
its behaviour.
22
 
 
Thirdly, debunking the rights-stripping idea may usefully inform the overarching 
debate as to the general position under s.6(3)(b) HRA of private organisations 
delivering contracted out public services. The extent to which hybrid public 
authorities can rely on their own Convention rights is bound to impact upon the scope 
of s.6(3)(b). The more draconian the effect on a private individual of being brought 
within s.6(3)(b) as a hybrid public authority, the narrower one would expect 
Parliament to have intended that provision to apply.
23
 This is particularly relevant to 
the position of contracted out public service providers because the attempts by the 
majority of the House of Lords in YL to counter the basic argument in favour of 
reading s.6(3)(b) to apply to contracted out public services were largely unconvincing, 
indicating in turn that the issue is still live and that a prima facie case in favour of 
interpreting s.6(3)(b) to apply to private contractors still exists. 
 
A detailed reappraisal of the relative strengths and weaknesses of reading s.6(3)(b) to 
include the provision of contracted out public services is not the aim here,
24
 but it 
nevertheless helps to introduce and briefly defend the basic argument in favour of 
doing so in order to illustrate this article’s potential contribution to it. Although their 
Lordships’ remarks on the status under s.6(3)(b) of contracted out services in YL were 
                                                 
20
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95. 
21
 [2002] EWCA Civ 366, [2002] H.R.L.R. 30. 
22
 It is clear that hybrid public authorities, most of whom will be legal persons, will be unable to rely on 
Convention rights exercisable only by natural persons, such as the right to freedom from torture (art.3) 
and to freedom of conscience (art.9): see Verein “Kontakt-Information-Therapie” v Austria (1988) 57 
D.R. 81. 
23
 D. Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the Human 
Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476, pp.490-492; Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow 
and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [11] 
(Lord Nicholls); A. Williams, “YL v Birmingham City Council: Contracting out and ‘functions of a 
public nature’” [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 524, p.530. 
24
 On this issue, see especially P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of 
judicial review” (2002) 118 L.Q.R. 551 and C. Donnelly, “Leonard Cheshire again and beyond: private 
contractors, contract and s.6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act” [2005] P.L. 785. 
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made in relation to the provision of residential care services, where Parliament has 
since intervened to make its position on the delivery of such services by private 
contractors clear,
25
 they are still relevant to the remaining contexts where contracting 
out may occur. In Leonard Cheshire, affirmed by the House of Lords in YL, the Court 
of Appeal ruled that a private charity was not performing a public function under 
s.6(3)(b) when delivering residential care services on behalf of a local authority. 
Leading the court in Leonard Cheshire, Lord Woolf C.J. stated that “it does not 
follow that the charity is performing a public function” under s.6(3)(b) when 
providing residential care, even though the local authority would have been regarded 
as performing a public function when doing so itself.
26
 Paul Craig’s response, which 
will be referred to as the ‘contracting out’ argument, is that a function, if public in 
nature when performed by a local authority or any other core public authority, “should 
equally be so [under s.6(3)(b)] when contracted out” and performed by a private 
provider on the local authority’s behalf.27 
 
The majority’s responses to this argument in YL, with respect, left much to be desired. 
Lords Mance and Neuberger denied that the care home context involved contracting 
out altogether, because the only duty imposed upon local authorities by the National 
Assistance Act was to arrange accommodation rather than undertake the different 
function of providing it as the private operator did.
28
 That the local authority enjoyed 
a statutory power to provide the accommodation itself, and that the provider was 
doing so on the local authority’s behalf, had no bearing on the nature of the function 
performed by the private provider in their Lordships’ eyes. Rightly described by 
Baroness Hale as “artificial and legalistic” in her dissent,29 this view simply ignores 
without more, rather than addresses, the logical force of the contracting out argument 
in relation to functions which core public authorities have powers rather than duties to 
perform in-house.
30
 In a second attempt to address the contracting out argument, Lord 
Scott rhetorically asked: 
 
“If every contracting out by a local authority of a function that the local authority could, in 
exercise of a statutory power or the discharge of a statutory duty, have carried out itself, turns 
the contractor into a hybrid public authority… for section 6(3)(b) purposes, where does this 
end?”31 
 
The apocalyptic prediction that “every” instance of contracting out would render the 
contractor a hybrid public authority is unfounded. The contracting out argument 
would only apply to functions regarded as public in nature when performed by the 
core public authorities who contract them out to private providers.
32
 Although the 
                                                 
25
 HSCA, s.145. 
26
 R. (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ 366, [2002] H.R.L.R. 30. at [15]. 
27
 P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review” (2002) 118 
L.Q.R. 551, p.556. 
28
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [114] (Lord Mance) and [147] 
(Lord Neuberger). 
29
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [66]. See also [16] (Lord 
Bingham). 
30
 See further A. Williams, “YL v Birmingham City Council: Contracting out and ‘functions of a public 
nature’” [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 524, p.529. 
31
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [30]. See also [153] (Lord 
Neuberger). 
32
 P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review” (2002) 118 
L.Q.R. 551, p.556. 
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argument does presuppose a reasonably clear distinction between the ‘public’ and 
‘private’ functions of core public authorities, a basic distinction can at least be drawn 
between clearly public functions “in the classic, social welfare sense”33 such as 
providing residential care services, on the one hand, and clearly private ones such as 
employing cleaning staff for local authority offices, on the other. Whilst separating 
the public from private functions of core public authorities may seem an unnatural 
exercise as it has no bearing on their HRA liability as bodies required to comply with 
the Convention in respect of all their acts,
34
 the contracting out argument 
demonstrates that it may nevertheless assist the interpretation of the term “functions 
of a public nature” under s.6(3)(b).35 Thus, Lord Neuberger’s assertion in YL that the 
concept of public functions relates exclusively to hybrid public authorities, and not 
core public authorities,
36
 is not obviously correct. Thirdly and finally, Lord Mance, 
with whom Lords Scott and Neuberger agreed, seemed tacitly and more generally to 
reject the contracting out argument on the footing that the lawful performance of 
functions for self-serving commercial gain, usually the motivation of contracted out 
service providers, will “point against” treating those functions as public in nature 
under s.6(3)(b).
37
 In response, this tends to empty s.6(3)(b) of any real purpose as a 
provision intending to subject certain private persons to Convention standards. As 
Jonny Landau observes, the blanket exclusion of commercial activity from s.6(3)(b) 
would even appear, in conflict with Keith J.’s uncontroversial ruling in R. (A) v 
Partnerships in Care Ltd,
38
 to exclude from s.6(3)(b) the activities of private 
psychiatric hospitals exercising statutory coercive powers to detain and treat patients 
against their will.
39
 
 
The contracting out argument, it is argued, retains its doctrinal force even after YL. 
Whilst this article’s conclusions do not logically compel the conclusion that the 
contracting out argument is correct, by debunking the rights-stripping idea they 
nevertheless tend to support it by presenting the hybrid public authority concept in a 
form less damaging to the existing positions of the bodies caught by s.6(3)(b) and, as 
a result, potentially riper for judicial or legislative expansion to private contractors 
than the rights-stripping idea would have implied. 
 
Interpreting the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
It is now possible, with the research case and the implications of this article’s findings 
explained, to begin demonstrating those findings. This part of the article argues that 
Strasbourg does not clearly recognise a hybridity doctrine. Private persons do not 
appear to become governmental organisations upon the performance of public 
                                                 
33
 P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the scope of judicial review” (2002) 118 
L.Q.R. 551, p.557. 
34
 This is the effect of s.6(5) HRA’s reference only to hybrid public authorities. 
35
 A. Williams, “YL v Birmingham City Council: Contracting out and ‘functions of a public nature’” 
[2008] E.H.R.L.R. 524, p.529. 
36
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [141]. 
37
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [116]. 
38
 [2002] EWHC 529 (Admin), [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2610. Lord Mance referred to and even appeared to 
approve of the Partnerships in Care ruling himself in YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, 
[2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [121]. 
39
 J. Landau, “Functional public authorities after YL” [2007] P.L. 630, p.636. See also S. Palmer, 
“Public functions and private services: a gap in human rights protection” (2008) 6 I.J.C.L. 585, p.601. 
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functions but, instead, remain private persons through and through.
40
 The analysis 
proceeds in three steps. First, it explains the nature of the public-private scheme in 
Strasbourg and why the governmental organisation jurisprudence is potentially 
relevant to the domestic courts’ treatment of the public authority concept under s.6 
HRA at all. It then introduces and briefly defends the potential utility of what will be 
referred to as the ‘selflessness principle’ as an analytical tool with which to help 
clarify the meaning and scope of the governmental organisation jurisprudence. The 
third and final stage examines the Strasbourg rulings, applying the selflessness 
principle to some of them, arguing that in no decided cases can Strasbourg clearly be 
said to have acknowledged the existence of a hybridity doctrine. This part of the 
article’s overall aim is merely to cast doubt on the idea that Strasbourg recognises 
such a doctrine. Some of the rulings, it will be seen, are so ambiguous in their 
reasoning as to prevent a clear picture emerging either way. Inferring a hybridity 
doctrine from the jurisprudence too readily, however, involves the risk of 
misclassifying hybrid public authorities as governmental organisations and denying 
them Convention protection in domestic law when they would have enjoyed such 
protection in Strasbourg. The burden of proof, which this part argues has not been 
discharged, falls strongly upon those who believe in the existence of a hybridity 
doctrine in Strasbourg to demonstrate it convincingly. 
 
The public-private scheme in Strasbourg 
As seen above, art.34 ECHR generates a distinction between governmental 
organisations and private individuals for the purposes of establishing who can mount 
Convention claims in Strasbourg. But there is also a second sense, relating to state 
responsibility, in which Strasbourg must distinguish public from private. On the 
international plane, there are two ways in which a particular body can engage the 
state’s responsibility if it behaves in a way which affects the enjoyment by a victim of 
their Convention rights.
41
 The state will be straightforwardly responsible for the 
body’s actions if the body is an organ of the state. This will be referred to as ‘direct’ 
responsibility. Alternatively, if the body is another private individual rather than an 
organ of the state, the state will be responsible for the body’s actions if the state is 
under and has breached a positive obligation to take steps to protect the victim from 
the body’s behaviour. This second and subtler form of responsibility will be referred 
to as ‘indirect private’ responsibility. 
 
Whether or not the indirect private responsibility jurisprudence can assist the courts in 
interpreting the term “functions of a public nature” under s.6(3)(b) HRA is unclear. 
Helen Quane has argued that it can never be of assistance because it would be 
artificial, she believes, to regard bodies engaging the state’s responsibility under the 
indirect private responsibility principle, such as a prisoner killing a cellmate, as 
performing ‘public’ functions in domestic law.42 By contrast however, as Baroness 
Hale stated in YL: 
 
                                                 
40
 See also H. Davis, “Public Authorities as ‘Victims’ under the Human Rights Act” [2005] C.L.J. 315, 
p.321. 
41
 H. Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of ‘public authority’ under the Human 
Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106, pp.107-108. 
42
 H. Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of ‘public authority’ under the Human 
Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106, p.108. 
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 “The most effective way for the United Kingdom to fulfil its positive obligation to protect 
individuals against violations of their rights is to give them a remedy against the violator 
[under s.6(3)(b)].”43  
 
It is unnecessary to express a firm view on the relevance of the indirect private 
responsibility jurisprudence to s.6(3)(b) for present purposes. It is clear from the very 
nature of the indirect private responsibility principle that the bodies engaging the 
state’s responsibility under it are not governmental organisations and, as a result, that 
they would enjoy Convention rights under art.34 and s.7 HRA whether regarded by 
s.6(3)(b) as hybrid public authorities or not. Since it allows the author to refine an 
earlier published view however,
44
 it is worth stating some brief observations. In the 
vast majority of circumstances, Quane’s view that it would be artificial to regard 
bodies engaging the state’s responsibility in this way will prevail. The normal 
relevance of indirect private responsibility jurisprudence, as the third part of this 
article explains in greater detail, is to the nature of the domestic courts’ duties as 
public authorities to give a certain degree of ‘horizontal effect’ to the Convention by 
developing the common law compatibly with it.
45
 There may nevertheless be isolated 
circumstances, however, in which indirect private responsibility jurisprudence could 
be relevant to the identification of public functions under s.6(3)(b) HRA. Where the 
state is placed under a positive obligation to regulate the behaviour of a private 
individual to whom it is deemed to have delegated either “state powers”46 or a 
function for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the state’s Convention47 or other 
international law obligations,
48
 those delegated functions might more easily be 
described as ‘public’ in nature under s.6(3)(b).49 Whether these cases evince a 
sufficiently developed line of jurisprudence to be of real significance to the courts’ 
interpretation of the term “functions of a public nature” under s.6(3)(b) however, 
especially given the ECtHR’s failure to define the term “state powers” clearly, is 
another matter. Additionally, even if such cases might properly be regarded as 
relevant to the scope of s.6(3)(b), it is far from clear, in response to the reluctance of 
Lords Mance and Neuberger in YL to interpret s.6(3)(b) as being any broader than the 
category of activities which would engage the state’s responsibility under such 
indirect private responsibility rulings,
50
 that Parliament would wish to confine the 
scope of that provision to them.
51
 The terminology of “functions of a public nature” 
employed by s.6(3)(b), unused by Strasbourg in these indirect private responsibility 
rulings, is specific to the HRA. Moreover, the Court of Appeal has already exceeded 
                                                 
43
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [60]. 
44
 See A. Williams, “YL v Birmingham City Council: Contracting out and ‘functions of a public 
nature’” [2008] E.H.R.L.R. 524, p.527, agreeing with Quane. 
45
 A. Williams, “YL v Birmingham City Council: Contracting out and ‘functions of a public nature’” 
[2008] E.H.R.L.R. 524, p.527. 
46
 Sychev v Ukraine (Application No. 4773/02) (unreported), para.54. 
47
 Van der Mussele v Belgium (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. 163, para.29; Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom 
(1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 112, para.27. 
48
 Woś v Poland (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 28 (the relevant decision is the admissibility decision of March 1, 
2005), para.73. 
49
 See the discussion by Lord Mance in YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 
A.C. 95 at [92]-[99]. 
50
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [99] (Lord Mance) and [161] 
(Lord Neuberger). 
51
 For criticism of the courts’ tendency to bind themselves to Strasbourg rulings, see e.g. R. Masterman, 
“Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?” [2004] P.L. 725; 
J. Lewis, “The European ceiling on human rights” [2007] P.L. 720. 
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the rulings’ scope by applying s.6(3)(b) to a private not-for-profit company 
established and assisted by a local authority to run a series of farmers’ markets, where 
no discernible delegation by the state to that company for the purpose of performing a 
Convention or other international obligation had occurred.
52
 
 
Unlike the indirect private responsibility jurisprudence, whose relevance to the 
interpretation of the term “public authority” under s.6(1) is uncertain, Strasbourg’s 
concepts of the governmental organisation under art.34 and the organ of the state 
under the direct responsibility principle are clearly of some relevance to the courts’ 
interpretation of the public authority concept under s.6 HRA. Like s.6, they also 
attempt to draw a basic public-private distinction in the Convention context. It is 
evident from various rulings in which Strasbourg cross-refers between the art.34 and 
direct responsibility strands of jurisprudence that Strasbourg regards the categories of 
governmental organisation under art.34 and organs of the state under the direct 
responsibility principle as identical.
53
 The ‘governmental organisation’ terminology 
will therefore be used in this article to refer to governmental bodies under each strand 
of jurisprudence. Whilst the governmental organisation jurisprudence relates loosely 
to the public authority concept under the HRA, this part argues that it is only relevant 
to the identification of core and not hybrid public authorities. 
 
The selflessness principle as an analytical tool 
When analysing the nature of the public-private distinction under the governmental 
organisation jurisprudence, it is sensible to start by examining the distinction between 
core public authorities and private persons under s.6 HRA. In Aston Cantlow v 
Wallbank, which concerned the status under s.6 of a Parochial Church Council (PCC) 
seeking to enforce chancel repair liability against the defendants, their Lordships 
believed the core public authority and governmental organisation categories of bodies 
to be coterminous. As Lord Hope stated with the agreement of the remaining 
members of the Appellate Committee:
54
 
 
“The test as to whether a person or body is or is not a ‘core’ public authority for the purposes 
of section 6(1) is not capable of being defined precisely. But it can at least be said that a 
distinction should be drawn between those persons who, in Convention terms, are 
governmental organisations on the one hand and those who are non-governmental 
organisations on the other.”55 
 
Useful guidance as to the meaning of the governmental organisation concept might 
therefore be found by examining the nature of core public authorities. A basic 
institutional dichotomy can be identified between core public authorities and private 
persons in domestic law: generally, core public authorities such as central and local 
government organisations “are regarded as being under duties to act only in the public 
                                                 
52
 R. (Beer) v Hamsphire Farmers’ Markets Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1056, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 233. 
53
 Danderyds Kommun v Sweden (Application No. 52559/99) (unreported), applied in that respect in 
the Scottish case of Grampian University Hospitals NHS Trust v Napier 2004 J.C. 117; Hautaniemi v 
Sweden (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. C.D.155; Novoseletskiy v Ukraine (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 53, para.82. 
54
 See Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, 
Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [6]-[7] (Lord Nicholls), [160] (Lord 
Rodger), [129] (Lord Scott) and [87] (Lord Hobhouse). 
55
 Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, 
Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [47]. 
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interest as they perceive it to be”,56 in a way that private persons, who by contrast are 
generally entitled to act for profit or in the interests of shareholders, are not. Various 
factors might suggest that a body is a core public authority. Although none are of 
themselves conclusive, they include the exercise of ‘authority’ itself by the possession 
of special or coercive powers, public funding, a statutory basis and democratic 
accountability.
57
 The institutional dichotomy between core public authorities and 
private persons (herein referred to as the ‘selflessness principle’) serves as a useful 
analytical tool by illustrating the basic and necessary ‘selflessness’ of core public 
authorities as contrasted with the lawful ‘selfishness’ of institutionally private 
persons. The latter are free to do anything which the law does not expressly prohibit;
58
 
with the possible exception of charities and fiduciaries,
59
 they should be readily 
recognisable, according to the principle, by their ability and inclination in domestic 
law to serve themselves over anyone else. The selflessness principle appears to form 
the basis of their Lordships’ observations on the nature of the core public authority 
concept in Aston Cantlow,
60
 which implicitly suggests that the same principle also 
                                                 
56
 D. Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the Human 
Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476, pp.483-484 (emphasis original). For a similar statement in a more 
theoretical setting, see J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, Oxford, 1986), p.5. Oliver is not 
necessarily correct to suggest, as she does at p.484, that private persons must be under duties to 
perform certain functions in the public interest before those functions can be regarded as public in 
nature under s.6(3)(b), however. Some public functions may involve this duty. For instance, a private 
psychiatric hospital exercising the statutory power to detain and treat mental inpatients, which Keith J 
ruled was a public function under s.6(3)(b) in R. (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 529 
(Admin), [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2610, must obviously exercise this function in the interests of the patient or 
the public and not, absent these interests, in its commercial interests alone: see the Mental Health Act 
1983, ss 3(2)(c), 2(2)(b), 4(2) and 5(4)(a). But the commercial provision of public services on a core 
public authority’s behalf will not involve such a duty. It is difficult to see why all public functions 
under s.6(3)(b) should necessarily share a common conceptual basis given the nebulousness of the 
drafting of that provision. The idea that a universal basis exists, however intellectually appealing the 
idea may be, is probably a chimera. 
57
 D. Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities and public functions under the Human 
Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476, pp.481-483. 
58
 R. v Somerset County Council, ex p Fewings [1995] 1 All E.R. 513 (Q.B.), p.524 (Laws J.); R. 
(Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2001] EWHC 429 (Admin) at [72] (Stanley Burnton J.). 
59
 Whilst charities act for others, they might nevertheless be capable of description as selfish bodies 
given that they act in accordance with voluntarily-assumed charitable objectives “rather than in the 
public interest more generally”: C. Donnelly, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties: A 
Comparative Perspective (OUP, Oxford, 2007), p.113. The same might also be said of fiduciaries. If 
fiduciaries could not properly be described as selfish rather than selfless actors however, it is unclear to 
what extent it would be unacceptable for fiduciary functions to fall within s.6(3)(b) given the 
uncertainty over the ambit and rationale of the fiduciary principle. It has even been suggested that the 
principle “is informed in some measure by considerations of public policy aimed at preserving the 
integrity and utility of these relationships… given the purposes they serve in society”: P. Finn, 
“Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World”, in E. McKendrick (ed.), Commercial Aspects of 
Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (OUP, Oxford, 1992) p.7, at p.10. Hence, it would not be self-
evidently improper to impose upon fiduciaries an additional obligation to act compatibly with the 
Convention. 
60
 Oliver’s work was described as “valuable” by Lord Nicholls: Parochial Church Council of the 
Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, 
[2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [7]. Rejecting the argument that the PCC was a core public authority, Lord 
Nicholls observed, at [14], that it was “a church body engaged in self-governance and the promotion of 
its own affairs” (emphasis added). Along the same lines, Lord Hope emphasised, at [62], that churches’ 
activities concern “purely internal matters which do not reach out into the sphere of the state”, Lord 
Hobhouse that the PCC acts for the “diocese and the congregation of believers in the parish” 
voluntarily coming to it, at [86], and, at [156], Lord Rodger stated that the PCC exists “to accomplish 
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underlies the distinction between governmental organisations and private persons in 
Strasbourg. As an obvious indicator of that principle in operation, the ECtHR has 
ruled on two occasions that bodies are not governmental organisations if they possess 
predominantly self-serving commercial motives.
61
 Taking state responsibility and 
art.34 rulings in turn, the following analysis examines significant Strasbourg rulings 
which might be thought to evince a hybridity doctrine, employing the selflessness 
principle where appropriate to help rationalise them and criticise the idea that private 
persons performing public or governmental functions are regarded as governmental 
organisations in Strasbourg. 
 
Analysing the Strasbourg jurisprudence- state responsibility rulings 
In Appleby v United Kingdom,
62
 a private shopping centre owner had refused the 
applicants permission to assemble at the centre to petition the public on a local 
planning issue. The applicants alleged breaches of arts 10 and 11 ECHR, which 
guarantee the rights to freedom of expression and assembly respectively. The ECtHR 
held that the owner, a private company and transferee of the property from a public 
development corporation, did not engage the UK’s responsibility under either the 
direct
63
 or indirect private
64
 responsibility principles. Appleby has been interpreted as 
suggesting that a private body’s actions can sometimes engage the state’s 
responsibility under the direct responsibility principle,
65
 but this is difficult to 
reconcile with the court’s resilience to further argument, having observed that the 
alleged interference emanated from an institutionally private actor, as to why that 
actor should nevertheless be regarded as a governmental organisation.
66
 Additionally, 
if the court did accept that a private body could sometimes engage the state’s 
responsibility under the direct responsibility principle, it gave no indication as to how. 
 
Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom,
67
 which has previously been interpreted as a 
direct responsibility ruling evincing a hybridity doctrine,
68
 concerned the UK’s 
responsibility for the actions of the headmaster of a private school in administering 
corporal punishment to a pupil. The pupil alleged the breach of the rights to freedom 
from inhuman and degrading treatment and to private life under arts 3 and 8 ECHR. 
Despite finding no breach of the Convention, the ECtHR ruled that the private school 
                                                                                                                                            
the Church’s own mission, not the aims and objectives of the government”. Lord Scott declared 
himself, at [129], to be “in complete agreement” with Lords Hope and Rodger. 
61
 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 24, para.73; Ukraine-Tyumen v 
Ukraine (Application No. 22603/02) (unreported), para.27. 
62
 (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 38. 
63
 Appleby v United Kingdom (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 38, para.41. 
64
 Appleby v United Kingdom (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 38, paras 49-50. 
65
 H. Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of ‘public authority’ under the Human 
Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106, p.113. Quane seems to present the Appleby ruling as rejecting the claim, 
on the facts, that “the simple transference of assets from public to private bodies will… engage the 
[direct] responsibility of the state for the actions of the private bodies” (p.113), rather than as rejecting 
the underlying principle that private bodies may engage the state’s responsibility in this way. 
66
 Appleby v United Kingdom (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 38, para.41. 
67
 Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 112. 
68
 Quane evidently interprets the ECtHR’s ruling in Costello-Roberts as a direct responsibility ruling 
because she believes the ruling to be instructive in determining the meaning of “functions of a public 
nature” under s.6(3)(b), having earlier argued that indirect private responsibility jurisprudence can 
never be relevant to the domestic courts’ treatment of that provision: see H. Quane, “The Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and the meaning of ‘public authority’ under the Human Rights Act” [2006] P.L. 106, 
pp.108 and 110. 
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engaged the state’s responsibility. To support its conclusion, the court observed that 
states were required “to secure to children their right to education” by art.2 of the First 
Protocol to the Convention, that disciplinary functions were not “merely ancillary to 
the educational process”, that independent schools “co-exist with a system of public 
education” in the United Kingdom, and that “the State cannot absolve itself from 
responsibility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or individuals”.69 The 
case does not clearly evince a hybridity doctrine, it is argued, because it is not clearly 
a direct responsibility ruling dealing with the governmental organisation concept at 
all. In YL, Lord Mance described Costello-Roberts as “not an easy case to analyse”70 
before noting that the ECtHR in Storck v Germany
71
 saw it as a judgment based on the 
principle of indirect private responsibility rather than direct responsibility. Lord 
Mance’s reading more accurately reflects the tenor of the Costello-Roberts judgment, 
in which the ECtHR began the relevant analysis by emphasising that states can be 
under positive obligations to regulate private activity.
72
 The state, it would seem, was 
responsible for the school not because it was a governmental organisation but, instead, 
via the positive obligation doctrine, because it was a private body performing the 
delegated function of assisting the state to secure its Convention obligation to provide 
education by disciplining school pupils. 
 
In Van der Mussele v Belgium,
73
 a pupil advocate alleged the breach of the right to 
freedom from forced labour under art.4 ECHR when compelled by the institutionally 
independent Belgian Order of Advocates to provide free legal services to indigent 
persons. Despite finding no breach of the Convention, the ECtHR rejected the 
government’s prior submission that Belgium could not be responsible for the actions 
of the Order of Advocates. The court advanced two main points. First, the obligation 
upon the state to provide legal assistance to indigent persons derived from art.6 
ECHR, and Belgium had chosen to ensure its compliance with that obligation by 
compelling the Order to compel advocates to undertake the work, which solution 
could not “relieve the Belgian state of the responsibilities it would have incurred… 
had it chosen to operate the system itself.”74 Secondly, the Order of Advocates was 
“associated with the exercise of judicial power”, created by legislation and “endowed 
with legal personality in public law”.75 Along Costello-Roberts lines, the first point 
implies that the Order of Advocates was a private body that engaged the state’s 
responsibility by performing a function delegated to it by the state to ensure the state’s 
compliance with its art.6 obligation to provide free legal assistance. The second point 
is significant because it suggests that the Order of Advocates was a body created and 
controlled to serve the public interest, which according to the selflessness principle 
would indicate its status as a governmental organisation. When taken together, points 
one and two might therefore be thought to evince a hybridity doctrine by suggesting 
that the body was a governmental organisation precisely because it was a private 
person performing the ‘delegated’ function in question. In response however, it is not 
                                                 
69
 Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 112, paras 27-28. 
70
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [95]. 
71
 (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 6. 
72
 Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 112, para.26. 
73
 Van der Mussele v Belgium (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. 163. 
74
 Van der Mussele v Belgium (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. 163, para.29. This reasoning broadly resembles that in 
Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 112, where the ECtHR, at para.27, relied on 
Van der Mussele to support its argument that the state was responsible for the actions of the private 
school. 
75
 Van der Mussele v Belgium (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. 163, para.29. 
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clear that the two points advanced by the court were intended to be read in this way. 
At the very least, the suggestion that private persons were regarded as governmental 
organisations in Strasbourg by performing these delegated functions would sit 
uncomfortably with the later ruling in Costello-Roberts which, as seen above, appears 
to treat such persons not as governmental organisations but instead as private 
individuals who engage the state’s responsibility through the indirect private 
responsibility doctrine.
76
 The court in Van der Mussele should be taken, instead, as 
seeking to advance alternative arguments to the effect that the body either engaged 
the state’s responsibility under the indirect private responsibility principle by 
performing delegated Convention obligations or that it did so as a governmental 
organisation under the direct responsibility principle by virtue of its status as a 
‘selfless’ body created and controlled by the state to regulate the relevant arm of the 
Belgian legal profession. 
 
One final case warrants analysis. In Sychev v Ukraine,
77
 the ECtHR held that a 
liquidation commission empowered to execute judgments against a liquidated state-
owned company engaged the state’s responsibility in respect of an art.6 claim by the 
applicant when it failed to execute judgments in a timely manner. The court stated as 
follows: 
 
“The Court does not find it necessary to embark on a discussion of whether the liquidation 
commission was or was not itself a State authority for the purposes of Article 34 § 1 of the 
Convention. It suffices to note that the body in question exercised certain state powers at least 
in the execution of court judgments.”78 
 
The distinction between “State authority” and other bodies exercising “state powers” 
may appear, as Lord Mance remarked in YL, to “mirror” the distinction between core 
and hybrid public authorities under the HRA.
79
 Despite the reference in the above 
passage to governmental organisations under art.34 ECHR however, it is important to 
note, as Lord Mance observed, that the language of the judgment as a whole suggests 
the liquidation commission to have engaged the state’s responsibility as a private 
person under the indirect private responsibility principle rather than as a governmental 
organisation.
80
 Not decided on the basis of the direct responsibility principle 
therefore, Sychev does not clearly demonstrate that private bodies exercising state 
powers become governmental organisations in Strasbourg. 
 
Analysing the Strasbourg jurisprudence- Article 34 rulings
81
 
In Radio France v France,
82
 the applicants alleged the breach of arts 6, 7 and 10 
ECHR after encountering domestic sanction in the law of defamation for broadcasting 
                                                 
76
 Further support for this point can be found in Sychev v Ukraine (Application No. 4773/02) 
(unreported), paras 53-54. 
77
 Sychev v Ukraine (Application No. 4773/02) (unreported). 
78
 Sychev v Ukraine (Application No. 4773/02) (unreported), para.54. 
79
 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [98]. 
80
 See Sychev v Ukraine (Application No. 4773/02) (unreported), paras 53-54; YL v Birmingham City 
Council [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 A.C. 95 at [97]-[98]. 
81
 The article does not analyse Holy Monasteries v Greece (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 1. Quane believes it to 
be instructive in interpreting “functions of a public nature” under s 6(3)(b) HRA: H. Quane, “The 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and the meaning of ‘public authority’ under the Human Rights Act” [2006] 
P.L. 106, p.115. However, this is based on the erroneous belief that Strasbourg jurisprudence was used 
to interpret s.6(3)(b) in Aston Cantlow. As seen above, their Lordships appeared to see the relevance of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence only to the core public authority concept. 
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damning stories about the former deputy mayor of Paris. The ECtHR held Radio 
France, a state-financed radio broadcaster, to be a non-governmental organisation 
capable of filing an art.34 complaint. The court stated in its analysis that the phrase 
‘governmental organisation’ applies not only to central state organs, “but also to 
decentralised authorities”, such as local authorities, exercising “public functions”.83 It 
then stated that this was also true of “public-law entities other than territorial 
authorities”.84 
 
The court drew from the two Commission cases of Consejo General
85
 and RENFE v 
Spain
86
 during its analysis. In Consejo General, the Commission held that the General 
Council of Official Economists’ Associations (GCOEA), a professional regulatory 
body created by statute, was a governmental organisation under art.34 because it was 
a “national authority exercising public functions”.87 In RENFE, the Commission held 
the Spanish National Railway provider to be a governmental organisation due to its 
status as a public law organisation created by law, its accountability to government, 
the legal control on its internal structure and activities and its position as the sole 
railway provider.
88
 Radio France, Consejo General and RENFE are said to reveal that 
a body: 
 
“may be regarded as a governmental organisation when it has special powers conferred on it 
by the state such as an operating monopoly, when legislation confers official duties on it, or 
when it is subject to a high degree of control by the state.”89 
 
However, despite the use of the term “public functions” – similar to that used in 
s.6(3)(b) HRA – by the Commission in Consejo General, it is not clear that either of 
the governmental organisations in Consejo General and RENFE were private persons 
performing those functions. The GCOEA in Consejo General resembled a ‘selfless’ 
body established by law to regulate a particular profession. The Spanish National 
Railway provider in RENFE may have enjoyed administrative autonomy, but this 
does not of itself demonstrate its institutionally private nature,
90
 especially since it 
was also created by law and accountable to government. 
 
Interestingly, the Commission in Consejo General stated that the GCOEA, being a 
governmental organisation, “could not at any time” assert Convention rights by 
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 (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 29 (the ruling relevant for present purposes is the admissibility decision of 
September 23, 2003). 
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admissibility decision of September 23, 2003), para.26. 
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 Radio France v France (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 29 (the ruling relevant for present purposes is the 
admissibility decision of September 23, 2003), para.26. Quane believes the use of the term “territorial 
authority” to reveal a hybridity doctrine in Strasbourg: H. Quane, “The Strasbourg jurisprudence and 
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employing the term. 
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making an art.34 application.
91
 The implication of this is that either the organisation 
in Consejo General was what the HRA would regard as a core public authority (these 
bodies, “inherently incapable” of description as non-governmental organisations 
under art.34, are unable to enforce their own Convention rights),
92
 or it was what the 
HRA would regard as a hybrid public authority but was prevented from ever invoking 
its own Convention rights because it sometimes exercised public functions.
93
 
Advocating the relevance of the governmental organisation jurisprudence to the 
interpretation of s.6(3)(b), Quane believes the former conclusion to be incongruent 
with passages in Aston Cantlow urging a narrower interpretation of the core public 
authority category as compared to the hybrid category and consequently settles on the 
latter conclusion that the body was what the HRA would regard as a hybrid public 
authority.
94
 She notes however that the Commission’s view that the body could never 
invoke its own ECHR rights sits uncomfortably with the idea implied by s.6(5) HRA 
that hybrid public authorities should be able to invoke the Convention in their private 
capacities, and encourages Strasbourg to reconsider its remarks in Consejo General.
95
 
 
Especially given this article’s arguments, the obvious and compelling answer to this 
conundrum is to regard the GCOEA, and indeed any other bodies regarded by 
Strasbourg as governmental organisations, only as core public authorities under s.6 
HRA. Cases other than Consejo General take the view that governmental 
organisations can never invoke their own ECHR rights.
96
 Far from suggesting the 
reconsideration of dicta in a single decision, Quane would appear to be urging 
Strasbourg to rethink its interpretational attitudes to art.34 on a more general level. 
The governmental organisation jurisprudence should not be shoehorned into the 
hybrid public authority concept under s.6(3)(b) in this way. 
 
Summary 
Considering the Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning both state responsibility and 
art.34 ECHR, it is far from clear that Strasbourg recognises a hybridity doctrine. 
Some private individuals may engage the state’s responsibility by exercising functions 
or “state powers” delegated to them by the state for the purpose of ensuring full or 
partial compliance with the state’s Convention or other international obligations.97 
These functions, for the purpose of allowing a remedy against such bodies in domestic 
law, might even be capable of classification as “functions of a public nature” under 
s.6(3)(b) HRA. Crucially however, such bodies engage the state’s responsibility not as 
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governmental organisations but as private persons under the indirect private 
responsibility principle. 
 
Ensuring Convention protection for hybrid public authorities 
The foregoing analysis reveals that the governmental organisation concept cannot 
convincingly be said to extend to private persons performing public functions. The 
result is that hybrid public authorities, as private persons performing public functions 
under s.6(3)(b), retain the ability to rely on their own Convention rights under art.34 
ECHR and s.7 HRA, even during the performance of those public functions. The 
HRA provides for the rights-stripping idea neither explicitly nor, therefore, by 
necessary implication. 
 
This part of the article considers the practical issue of how to guarantee that hybrid 
public authorities retain the same ability to rely on the Convention when performing 
public functions that they would enjoy when acting privately. It proceeds in two 
stages. The first stage explains the existing mechanisms by which ‘ordinary’ private 
persons, i.e. persons who do not perform any public functions under s.6(3)(b), can 
rely on the Convention both offensively and defensively in domestic law. Its purpose 
is to illustrate how hybrid public authorities would be able to rely on the Convention 
in their private capacities under the HRA. The second stage than examines how 
hybrid public authorities might be guaranteed the same opportunity to do so when 
performing public functions. Whilst this will be for the most part straightforward, 
hybrid public authorities encounter a potential obstacle, as will be explored, when 
trying to rely on the Convention defensively against other private individuals during 
the performance of public functions. After considering potential solutions to the 
problem, this part argues that the most effective way to safeguard the rights of hybrid 
public authorities in this situation is to read the hybrid public authority concept as 
generating chameleonic horizontal effect. 
 
Private individuals and indirect horizontal effect 
Bodies satisfying the standing requirements of art.34, it is recalled, are regarded by 
the HRA as ‘victims’ capable of enforcing their Convention rights against public 
authorities in domestic law.
98
 A victim can deploy their Convention rights against a 
public authority in two ways. First, a victim can rely vertically on their Convention 
rights, using them either as a ‘sword’ to form the basis of a cause of action against the 
relevant public authority under s.7(1)(a) HRA, or as a ‘shield’, by relying on those 
rights under s.7(1)(b) by way of collateral challenge against a public authority 
initiating proceedings against them.
99
 Secondly, and because s.7(1)(b) allows victims 
to “rely [against a public authority] on the Convention right or rights concerned in any 
legal proceedings”,100 and because courts and tribunals are public authorities under 
the HRA,
101
 the possibility exists of a victim asserting their rights against the court 
hearing a dispute to which the victim is a party, even if the other party to that dispute 
is also a private individual rather than a public authority. The court’s duty to act 
compatibly with the Convention may therefore require it to allow a victim to deploy 
their rights to the detriment of the other private party to the dispute, thus generating a 
                                                 
98
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99
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form of “horizontal effect” of those rights against another private individual.102 This 
mechanism of horizontal effect, commonly known as ‘indirect’ horizontal effect, 
bears two key characteristics. First, it involves formally asserting Convention rights 
against the court as a public authority, rather than against the other private party to the 
dispute. Second, it must take place through the medium of an existing cause of action 
advanced by the claimant. The HRA does not provide victims with a direct cause of 
action against other private individuals because it is only unlawful for public 
authorities to act incompatibly with the Convention under s.6(1) HRA.
103
 Absent the 
possibility of a victim deploying the interpretative obligation under s.3 to enforce his 
or her rights indirectly against another private individual (which is not considered 
here),
104
 the only way in which a victim can assert their rights against an ‘ordinary’ 
private individual not acting as a hybrid public authority is through the indirect 
horizontal effect mechanism. 
 
There are two key issues for a victim wishing to take advantage of the horizontal 
effect mechanism as a ‘sword’ to enforce their rights indirectly against another private 
individual in this way. First, since this mechanism of horizontal effect depends partly 
upon the court’s duty as a public authority, the victim must establish that the court’s 
refusal to allow the victim to deploy their Convention right indirectly against the 
defendant private party to the dispute would actually amount to a violation of that 
Convention right.
105
 This is where the indirect private responsibility jurisprudence has 
its natural home, because that jurisprudence prescribes the extent to which states must 
protect victims by taking positive steps to regulate the conduct of other private 
individuals.
106
 The second issue, once it has been established that the failure to allow 
the victim to deploy his or her Convention right indirectly against the defendant 
would amount to a violation of that right, is the extent to which the court’s duty to act 
compatibly with the Convention requires the court, rather than Parliament, to take 
steps to safeguard the victim’s right.107 This issue, or more precisely the issue of the 
extent to which courts of binding precedent are required by s.6 HRA to develop the 
common law consonantly with the Convention, is a distinct and contested issue
108
 on 
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which judges do not yet seem to have reached a firm consensus.
109
 It is not necessary 
to attempt to resolve this issue here. For present purposes, it suffices to observe that 
the courts’ duties as public authorities do require them to engage in some Convention-
friendly common law development,
110
 but that this duty does not require the creation 
of new common law causes of action to allow victims to assert their Convention rights 
against private defendants.
111
 Hence, a victim seeking to take advantage of the 
Convention’s indirect horizontal effect must first plead a pre-existing common law 
cause of action before attempting to persuade the court hearing the dispute to 
discharge its duty as a public authority by developing that cause of action in a way 
which safeguards his or her Convention right.
112
 
 
The foregoing, it is emphasised, represents a description of how a private claimant 
might use the indirect horizontal effect mechanism as a sword against a private 
defendant to a dispute which is already underway. Nothing has been said so far, 
however, of the Convention rights of the private defendant in this situation. As a 
private individual, the defendant would also qualify as a ‘victim’ capable of asserting 
its rights “in any legal proceedings” against a public authority,113 including a court,114 
which it claims to have violated them. It is therefore open for the private defendant to 
deploy its rights as a shield against the private claimant, by making the counter-claim 
against the court that the action proposed by the court to discharge its s.6 duty to the 
claimant, if carried through, would violate the defendant’s own Convention rights. 
The precise mechanics of how the defendant advances such a counter-claim are 
slightly more complex, obscured as they are by the overwhelmingly dominant context 
of media freedom and breach of confidence in which the common law horizontal 
effect issue has arisen. This is a unique context which involves the contention by a 
claimant that the defendant media organisation has behaved (or would behave)
115
 in a 
way which in substance results in the violation of one or more of the claimant’s 
Convention rights, typically but not exclusively the right to privacy under art.8 
ECHR.
116
 The claimant then asks the court to grant relief in his or her favour so as to 
prevent or remedy the violation. Since the court is considering whether to grant relief 
that “might affect the exercise of the [media organisation’s] Convention right to 
freedom of expression,”117 the duty immediately arises upon the court, by virtue of 
s.12(4) HRA, “to have particular regard to the Convention right to freedom of 
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expression”, as protected by art.10 ECHR. The court must then undertake a balancing 
exercise between the right asserted by the claimant, on the one hand, and the 
defendant’s right to free expression, on the other, deciding which enjoys the stronger 
claim overall to protection.
118
 
 
However, outwith the media freedom context, where the s.12(4) injunction to courts 
to consider the private defendant’s Convention right is missing, it is nevertheless 
sufficiently clear that a private defendant, at least where the claimant is seeking to 
rely on a qualified Convention right which allows a proportionate restriction on that 
right to occur for the protection of the Convention rights of others, would enjoy the 
general ability to deploy its own Convention rights as a shield by drawing attention to 
the qualification and arguing that the “rights of others” includes its rights. Take the 
following example. Catherine, who has been forcibly evicted from Deborah’s shop as 
a trespasser, wishes to complain of a violation of the right to freedom of assembly 
under art.11 ECHR (let us presume that no other claim is open to her). She sues 
Deborah in tort, alleging battery. When in court, Catherine seeks to persuade the court 
to interpret the common law on battery consonantly with art.11 ECHR. But art.11(2) 
allows for restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly to occur if they “are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society… for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.” Deborah therefore responds, using her right to 
respect for property under art.1 of the First Protocol, that the court is not obliged to 
uphold Catherine’s proffered interpretation of the law on battery, either because the 
court’s failure to do so would amount to a ‘restriction’ by the court on Catherine’s 
right to freedom of assembly, and that such a restriction could be justified according 
to the “rights and freedoms of others” by reference to the proportionate protection of 
Deborah’s Convention right by the court, or, on the other hand, because the court’s 
obligation to act compatibly with Catherine’s art.11 right has arisen due to a positive 
obligation upon the state to regulate Deborah’s behaviour in these circumstances, and 
that this obligation must be balanced against other factors which include the 
qualifications under art.11(2) and therefore Deborah’s Convention right to respect for 
property.
119
 It may not always be clear which of these avenues would necessitate the 
balancing by the court of the rights asserted by claimant and defendant. The issue 
would depend essentially on why the state’s obligation to regulate Deborah’s 
behaviour for Catherine’s sake had arisen in the first place, i.e. whether the obligation 
existed because the court would engage the state’s responsibility under the direct 
responsibility principle by failing to protect Catherine’s Convention right in these 
circumstances, on the one hand, or because Deborah herself would engage the state’s 
responsibility under the indirect private responsibility principle, due to the existence 
upon the state of a positive obligation to regulate her behaviour for Catherine’s 
benefit, on the other. The distinction between direct responsibility and responsibility 
deriving from positive obligations is at times obscured by Strasbourg’s unwillingness 
to reveal the precise basis upon which it decides a state’s responsibility. The ECtHR 
sometimes prefers instead to assert that the technical distinction between negative and 
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positive obligations is insignificant; according to the court, the principles applicable to 
each basis of responsibility when determining whether the state has violated its 
obligations are similar: 
 
“In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, and in any case the 
State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation”.120  
 
Nevertheless, whichever avenue is relevant in a given case, it would seem clear either 
way that if a claimant in an existing dispute does seek to rely on a qualified right by 
using the indirect horizontal effect mechanism against a private defendant, that private 
defendant would enjoy the general opportunity to respond to the court that it would 
violate one or more of the defendant’s Convention rights to allow the claimant to do 
so.
121
 Whether the right(s) of the claimant or defendant prevailed would then depend 
on the outcome of the judicial balancing exercise which would take place between 
them. 
 
Hybrid public authorities and ‘chameleonic’ horizontal effect 
Having analysed the routes by which ordinary private persons and hybrid public 
authorities acting privately can deploy their Convention rights in domestic law, the 
issue arises of how to ensure that these routes remain open to hybrid public authorities 
during the performance of their public functions under s.6(3)(b) HRA. There are four 
ways, it is recalled, in which a hybrid public authority acting privately could deploy 
its Convention rights: vertically, as either a sword or a shield against a public 
authority, and horizontally, again as either a sword or a shield, indirectly against 
another private individual via the court as a public authority. 
 
Ensuring the hybrid public authority’s ability to mount vertical challenges during the 
performance of its public functions would be relatively straightforward. Quite simply, 
the performance of public functions by the hybrid public authority, whether it was 
seeking to deploy its Convention rights vertically as a sword or a shield, would be 
irrelevant to its ability to do so. Taking the facts of Jain v Trent Strategic Health 
Authority
122
 as an example, if a private care home operator’s business is ruined when 
a health authority applies to court to revoke the operator’s operating licence without 
giving adequate notice of the proceedings, the operator should be permitted to allege 
that the health authority’s actions breached art.1 of the First Protocol and art.6 of the 
Convention, whether or not the operator happened to be a hybrid public authority 
performing public functions under s.6(3)(b) HRA by delivering contracted out care 
services on behalf of a local authority at the time.
123
 The same would also be true if 
the hybrid public authority sought to rely on its Convention rights horizontally as a 
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sword by seeking to persuade the court to interpret an existing cause of action 
consonantly with its Convention rights during a dispute with a private defendant 
which was already underway. Domestic courts would simply need to refrain from 
treating the hybrid public authority as anything other than an ordinary private person 
in these circumstances. 
 
Ensuring that hybrid public authorities can rely on their Convention rights 
horizontally as a shield, however, is more complex. It is best guaranteed, it is argued, 
by reading the hybrid public authority concept as generating ‘chameleonic’ horizontal 
effect. As seen above during the analysis of the position of ordinary private persons, 
victims who cannot make use of s.3 HRA can only enforce their Convention rights 
against a private person by using the indirect horizontal effect mechanism. Also, if an 
ordinary private defendant finds itself on the receiving end of an attempt by a 
claimant to rely in this way on a qualified Convention right containing a ‘protection of 
the rights of others’ qualification, the defendant has the general ability to respond to 
the Convention claim – again, indirectly, via the court – by relying on its own 
Convention rights through that qualification. Whose Convention rights eventually 
prevail is determined by the judicial balancing exercise between them, but the fact 
that an ordinary private person has the opportunity to deploy its rights in this way, it is 
recalled, is the significant point to keep in mind. 
 
If, however, the private defendant were a hybrid public authority performing public 
functions and facing the direct accusation that it had violated a claimant’s Convention 
right, whether or not it could avail itself of the same opportunity would be heavily 
governed by how the court characterised the dispute at hand. The hybrid public 
authority provisions provide a victim with a statutory rights-based cause of action 
against an ostensibly public defendant and, to this end, therefore appear to allow that 
victim to rely vertically upon the Convention against a hybrid public authority in 
exactly the same way as against a core public authority such as a government 
department or local authority. But focussing on the provisions as vertical, however, 
generates problems for a hybrid public authority because it may find itself unable to 
rely on the Convention qualifications at all. At first instance in Leonard Cheshire, in 
which Stanley Burnton J. held in the context of an art.8 ECHR claim that a charity 
was not performing “functions of a public nature” under s.6(3)(b) by providing 
residential care and accommodation on behalf of a local authority, his Lordship 
observed that “the justifications referred to in Article 8.2 [ECHR] are all matters 
relevant to government, and not of any non-public body” such as a care home 
provider.
124
 Article 8(2) reads as follows: 
 
“There shall be no interference by a public authority [with the right to privacy]… except such 
as… is necessary… in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
It is indeed difficult to see how a care home provider could successfully claim that it 
was acting in the “economic well-being of the country” or “in the interests of national 
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security” when evicting a resident, for instance.125 As Sir Richard Buxton recently put 
it after retiring from the Court of Appeal:  
 
“Art 8(2) was plainly drafted with only public authorities in mind: bodies that, unlike private 
citizens, are responsible for, and have the authority to do something about, national security, 
public safety [and so on].”126  
 
Most significantly, it would strain the language of art.8(2) to say that the care home 
was acting for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others when seeking to rely 
on its own Convention right, say, to respect for property under art.1 of the First 
Protocol. In essence, if the hybrid public authority provisions are straightforwardly 
regarded as establishing a vertical framework for rights protection against a private 
body fulfilling the hybrid public authority criteria under ss 6(3)(b) and 6(5), the 
danger exists that hybrid public authorities, largely unable to rely directly on the 
Convention qualifications, would be denied free recourse to them. Since these 
qualifications may include the protection of the rights of “others”, a qualification from 
which ordinary private defendants can derive indirect Convention protection against 
private claimants via the court,
127
 hybrid public authorities would appear to be in a 
weaker position when exercising public functions than they would have been when 
acting in their private capacities. As a result, they would be rights-stripped. 
 
Two potential solutions to this problem have already been proffered elsewhere. First, 
as Stanley Burnton J. appeared to suggest in Leonard Cheshire, one might contain the 
problem by lending only a minimal reading to the scope of s.6(3)(b).
128
 This would 
require claimants to pursue the Convention claims against private defendants, which 
they would otherwise have pursued through s.6(3)(b), through other means such as s.3 
HRA or the common law indirect horizontal effect mechanism explained above. 
However, unless s.6(3)(b)’s scope were to be interpreted to vanishing point, which 
would flout Parliament’s clear intention to apply that provision to some private 
individuals, the problem of rights-stripping the remaining hybrid public authorities 
who were caught by that provision would remain. Moreover, neither the common law 
indirect horizontal effect mechanism nor s.3 HRA provide for rights-based causes of 
action to allow claimants to argue their Convention claims in court, indicating the 
alternative means of pursuing such claims to be inadequate substitutes for an action 
under s.6(3)(b) anyway. 
 
A second solution, which Sir Richard Buxton explores, is simply to fudge the text of 
art.8(2) or any other qualified Convention provisions referring to the rights of 
“others” to mean the rights of others including the hybrid public authority itself.129 
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Despite its alluring simplicity, this solution maintains a textual fiction which it would 
be preferable to avoid rather than embrace. 
 
A third solution, which this article argues is the most appropriate of the three because 
it would allow hybrid public authorities to use their rights horizontally as a shield and 
avoid the textual artificiality seen above, is to read the hybrid public authority 
provisions as generating ‘chameleonic’ horizontal effect. Under the chameleonic 
model, as its title may suggest, the framework of rights protection is regarded as 
switching, from ostensibly vertical to a position more closely resembling indirectly 
horizontal, at the point where the dispute in question reaches court. Essentially, ss 
6(1), 6(3)(b) and 6(5) establish a temporary fiction – that an institutionally private 
person is a public authority – in order to provide the cause of action necessary to bring 
that person to court. To ensure that hybrid public authorities are not defensively 
rights-stripped as compared to ordinary private individuals however, the private 
claimant, when in court, should no longer be seen as asserting their rights directly 
against the hybrid public authority itself but instead, as in litigation against an 
ordinary private defendant, indirectly against the hybrid public authority via the 
court.
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 Because the claimant is seeking during the course of the dispute to assert 
their rights against the court rather than the hybrid public authority itself, it would 
then be open for the defendant hybrid public authority, if the claimant relied on a 
qualified right, to respond to that claim by advancing its own Convention right 
through the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” or similar qualification 
contained in the right relied on by the claimant.
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 Whose rights prevailed, it is 
recalled, would be determined by the judicial balancing exercise undertaken between 
the rights in question. Crucially however, the chameleonic model would eliminate the 
risk of rights-stripping that the defendant would otherwise face if the hybrid public 
authority provisions were regarded as creating a purely vertical framework of rights 
protection. Whilst the framework can in formal terms be seen as either vertical, in the 
sense that ss 6(1), 6(3)(b) and 6(5) together generate a cause of action against an 
ostensibly public authority, or – though perhaps less obviously – directly horizontal, 
in the sense that the public authority is in reality a private individual, in substance the 
framework more closely resembles one of indirect horizontal effect than anything 
else: although the hybrid public authority provisions obviate the need for a claimant to 
pursue their Convention claim through an existing common law cause of action, that 
claimant, when in court, should properly be regarded as asserting the Convention 
against the defendant not directly but via the court instead. 
 
Conclusion 
The widely-held assumption that the HRA somehow denies hybrid public authorities 
Convention protection when performing public functions, this article has attempted to 
demonstrate, is a myth. Maintaining the ability of hybrid public authorities to rely on 
the Convention when performing public functions, for the most part, will be a 
straightforward task requiring simply that courts recognise the performance of public 
functions by a hybrid public authority as incapable of bearing on its ability to make 
                                                 
130
 As Stanley Burnton J. observed in passing at first instance in R. (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire 
Foundation [2001] EWHC 429 (Admin) at [73], although a private care home operator itself would be 
unable to plead the Convention qualifications, the courts can consider the care home’s position under 
the “rights of others” because the courts themselves are public authorities. 
131
 See also R. (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2001] EWHC 429 (Admin) at [73] (Stanley 
Burnton J.). 
download.docx 25 
Convention claims. The task becomes more complex, however, in situations where a 
hybrid public authority might wish to rely on the Convention defensively against a 
private claimant seeking to use the Convention against it. In these situations, 
safeguarding the Convention rights of hybrid public authorities is best achieved by 
reading the hybrid public authority provisions as generating chameleonic horizontal 
effect. The chameleonic model rests upon a simple proposition: although s.6(3)(b) 
HRA designates certain private persons as public authorities in order to allow private 
claimants to bring them to court based on allegations that they have acted unlawfully 
by breaching Convention rights, their status as rights-holders remains unaffected by 
the existence of the Convention-based cause of action against them such that they 
should be treated like any other private individuals during the dispute itself. 
 
Aside from proffering its findings for the purpose of aiding courts who may need to 
consider in detail the potential for hybrid public authorities to rely on the Convention 
in future, this article also injects the perennial debate over the proper scope of the 
term “functions of a public nature” under s.6(3)(b) with a much-needed fresh 
perspective. There is an obvious link between the width of that provision and the 
severity of the consequences for the individuals who are brought within it as hybrid 
public authorities. Debunking the rights-stripping idea as a significant source of harm 
to hybrid public authorities does not of itself compel the conclusion that s.6(3)(b) 
should be read to apply to the delivery of contracted out public services by private 
contractors. But especially given the weaknesses in the attempts in YL to explain why 
it should not, this article’s findings do represent an additional reason not to read 
s.6(3)(b) so narrowly. 
